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INTRODUCTION
"The World Breaks Everyone, and Afterward, Some Are
Strong at the Broken Places."
-Ernest Hemingway
Historically, societies across the globe have recognized bulls for their
uncompromising strength and power. In Spain and other nations, bulls
are both honored and feared through spectacles such as bullfighting while
in other cultures the bull has special significance as a zodiac symbol, an
astrological sign, a religious icon, and even as a team mascot. Most
recently, the American financial industry has adopted the bull to describe
a rising stock market, one that is too strong to fail.
Despite its cultural reverence and symbolism, the bull can cause great
destruction without proper guidance. The 2008 financial crisis had a
devastating impact on the financial health of global markets and provides
a perfect example of the destruction caused by the American financial
market's untamed strength. In an attempt to rebuild the broken financial
markets and address the underlying issues in the financial industry that
contributed to the financial crisis, Congress responded by enacting the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank) and tasked federal regulators with promulgating rules with respect
to many of its provisions.
In particular, provisions of Dodd-Frank addressed subprime lending
and mortgage securitization, which congressional findings and
administrative agency reports identified as significant contributing
factors to the financial crisis. In response to these criticisms, Dodd-Frank
prescribes partial credit risk retention for mortgage securitizers and
increased disclosure to investors in mortgage securities. Despite these
measures, Dodd-Frank falls short of correcting the failures of mortgage
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securitization in the United States and misses the opportunity to create a
stronger, more sustainable American financial market.
This Note discusses the history of mortgage lending and the
circumstances that led to the prevalence of mortgage securitization in the
United States. The Note then addresses the federal and state legislative
and regulatory responses to the financial crisis and identifies the
shortcomings of Dodd-Frank in correcting the underlying issues with
mortgage securitization that contributed to the crisis. The paper advances
covered bonds as a federal legislative alternative to mortgage
securitization and justifies a covered bond system based on the lack of
empirical evidence that supports Dodd-Frank's five percent credit risk
retention figure, social contract theory, strong social policy in favor of
home ownership and housing rights, and past financial regulatory failure.
While there are certain obstacles that would arise should Congress enact
a covered bond system, this Note concludes that the covered bond system
is the best federal solution for creating stronger, more resilient financial
markets in the United States.
State governments responded to the financial crisis through legislation
and legal action aimed at mitigating the effects of the financial crisis and
foreclosure on its citizens and court system through consumer education
programs, credit counseling, temporary financial assistance, and in some
cases legal action against mortgage lenders on behalf of its citizens.
Although these actions had varying levels of success, they also fall short
in many cases of adequately addressing the financial crisis. This Note
criticizes state government solutions that focus on temporary assistance
and advances mandatory mediation to alleviate the current issues with
mortgage securitization and subsequent foreclosure.
I. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION

The mortgage lending of today has evolved to take a substantially
different shape than its form in previous generations.' Traditionally, the
use of mortgage instruments by the commercial banking industry
facilitated the American dream by providing the opportunity for the
working class to accumulate wealth through home ownership. 2 Over
time, the banking industry and regulators alike began to call into question
the efficiency of the industry's mortgage lending model due to lack of

1. Roy D. Oppenheim & Jacquelyn K. Trask-Rahn, Deconstructing the Black Magic of
Securitized Trusts: How the Mortgage-Backed Securitization Process is Hurting the Banking
Industry's Ability to Foreclose and Proving the Best Offense for a ForeclosureDefense, 41
STETSON L. REv. 745, 751 (2012).
2. Id. at 745.
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profits and limited access to capital.3 During what has been termed by
some as the savings and loan crisis beginning in the 1980s, regulators
began to break down economic barriers for the mortgage lending industry
"with the hope that if troubled savings and loan associations (S&Ls)
could engage in more expansive and riskier activities, they could regain
profitability and recover their losses." 4 Some referred to this concept as
"gambling for resurrection," which encompassed the sentiment of many
financial analysts and regulators at the time. 5 "Many blamed the
industry's lack of profitability on onerous regulation and advocated
deregulation so that S&Ls could compete with other market entities on
an even playing field."6
To further the movement toward the deregulation of mortgage
lending, federal legislators passed bills that allowed banking institutions
to change both the type of borrower who could obtain a mortgage and the
mechanics of mortgage lending.7 Specifically, the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 19808 allowed mortgage
originators to charge higher interest rates to riskier borrowers and the
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act 9 (AMTPA) permitted the
adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) and balloon payment structures that
characterized the
subprime lending practices that many attribute to the
10
housing crisis.
The process of deregulation led banks to shift to an originate-todistribute model of mortgage lending." This shift accommodated banks'
need for access to capital by turning mortgages from illiquid assets to
liquid assets that originators could easily sell or otherwise distribute
through securitization. 12 Through the securitization process, banks could
quickly remove mortgages from their financial books and regain access
to capital which could then in turn be used to make more loans and
investments.' 3 In the mortgage securitization process, a mortgage
originator lends money to a home purchaser and sells the mortgage
immediately to a mortgage securitizer, which could be a traditional
commercial bank, an investment bank, or another type of financial

3. Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283,
1307 (2014).

4. Id.
5. Id.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 1307-08.
Oppenheim & Trask-Rahn, supra note 1, at 749.
12 U.S.C. § 226 (1980).
12 U.S.C. § 3801 (1989).

10.

Oppenheim & Trask-Rahn, supra note 1, at 749.

11.
12.
13.

Id. at750.
Id.
Id.
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institution, such as a shadow bank.14 The securitizer (or issuer) then pools
mortgages into large groups and sells the mortgage pool to a special
purpose vehicle (SPV), typically a trust created by the securitizer.I 5 In the
last step, the SPV issues securities, or ownership16 interests, in the
mortgage pool and sells those securities to investors.
Through the securitization process, traditional banks advocated that
they were more able to remove long term debt from their balance sheets
and to increase the volume of loans that they could offer. 7 While banks
had a financial incentive to securitize mortgages, banks no longer
retained any financial incentive to insure that borrowers could make their
mortgage payments.'" Instead, banks passed the risk of borrower default
the mortgage securities, causing disastrous
through to the investors1 in
9
economic consequences.
Issues with improperly aligned incentives in the securitization process
ran parallel to other developments in real estate and the economy.
Following a sharp increase in home prices between 1997 and 2006,
housing prices rapidly dropped.2 ° Simultaneously, interest rates on
ARMs began to rise and demand in the housing market fell
dramatically. 2 1 Homeowners began to default on their mortgages at an
alarming rate, congesting the court system with an average of 1.5 million
foreclosures every year.22 In addition to millions of Americans losing
their homes, many investors in the securitized mortgage pools lost sizable
investments. 23 After the dust settled, the subprime lending practices that
crisis cost an estimated $1 trillion net loss to
contributed to the financial 24
the United States economy.

14. FHFA Studies Securitizationof Acquired Member Assets, 2009 WL 8386674, at 74
Federal Register 8955, 95-773, Feb. 27, 2009.
15. Id.
16. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future ofSecuritization,41 CONN. L. REV. 1313,1316 (2009).
17. Id.at 1319.
18.

Id.

19. Oppenheim & Trask-Rahn, supra note 1, at 751-52.
20. Nestor M. Davidson, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing Crisis, 93 B.U.
L. REV. 389, 397-98 (2013).
21. Id.at398.
22. Id, at 398-99.
23. Vishal M. Mahadkar, Defending Skin-in-the-Game: How Regulators Should Structure
the FinalCreditRisk Retention Rules for the Residential MortgageMarket, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP.
&FiN. L. 405, 415-16 (2013).
24. Dwight M. Jaffee, Bank Regulation and Mortgage Market Reform, 8 BERKELEY Bus.
L.J. 8, 9 (2011).
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II. DODD-FRANK DOES NOT CREATE A STRONGER AMERICAN
FINANCIAL MARKET

In 2010, Congress responded to the crisis by enacting Dodd-Frank, a
sweeping piece of legislation aimed to correct the financial industry's
misaligned incentives with respect to mortgage lending.2 1 Specifically,
Dodd-Frank made mortgage lending restrictions that set forth industry
standards for the creditworthiness of borrowers.2 6 Dodd-Frank also
regulated the securitization of mortgages by requiring that securitizers
retain a five percent credit risk in what has commonly been referred to as
the "skin in the game" rule. 27 Reports published by the FDIC as part of
its rule making process succinctly illustrate the purpose of the skin in the
game rule, stating that the rule "provide[s] securitizers an incentive to
monitor and ensure the quality of the assets underlying a securitization
transaction, and, thus, help[s] align the interests of the securitizer with the
interests of investors." 28 Lastly, Dodd-Frank prescribes a29higher standard
of disclosure to investors of mortgage-backed securities.
The regulations, in their current form, are inadequate in addressing the
concerns that caused the financial crisis. First, the congressional record
and administrative agency reports lack authority that suggests that a five
percent risk retention will be a sufficient deterrent to banks in reducing
the risk involved in mortgage securitization. 30 Likewise, no foreign
jurisdiction has utilized a similar regulatory structure that has relied
solely on partial credit risk retention as a means of eliminating moral
hazard in mortgage securitization, and therefore, it is impossible to prove
that such a regulatory scheme can be successful. 31 Second, increased
disclosure does not necessarily eliminate the information asymmetries
related to complex financial products. 32 Third, the skin in the game rule
provides an exemption for qualified residential mortgages (QRM) which
has led to abuse through regulatory arbitrage. 33 Moreover, increased
25. Dodd-FrankWall Street Reform and Consumer ProtectionAct, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (2010).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-1 1.
28. FDIC Report, available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2013/201309-20_proposed-rule.pdf.
29. Id.
30. See generally Office of the Comptroller of Currency, ProposedRule on Credit Risk
Retention, (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=OCC-2013-00100001.
31. Id.
32. Steven L.Schwarcz, Rethinking the DisclosureParadigm in a World of Complexity,
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2004).
33. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving In To
Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1294 (2013); 15 U.S.C. §78o-11 (2010).

2014]

GRABBING THE BULL BY THE HORNS: THE FUTURE OF MORTGAGE LENDING

143

underwriting standards alone are insufficient
in eliminating the risk
34
securitization.
mortgage
with
associated
A. There is No Evidence that PartialRisk Retention Eliminates Moral
Hazardin Mortgage Securitization
Dodd-Frank's skin in the game rule has been the subject of much
disappointment by scholars in its ability to address the concerns that
resulted from the financial crisis. 35 The skin in the game rule requires that
securitizers retain "not less than" five percent risk in the securities that it
issues. 36 Through the rulemaking process, federal agencies have
interpreted that mandate by requiring securitizers to retain only the
absolute minimum risk.37
The final rule proposal submitted jointly by the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency (OCC), the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA), the FDIC, and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) reflects a substantially weakened credit risk
retention rule with little ability to ameliorate the causes of the financial
crisis with respect to mortgage lending. In failing to narrowly define the
risk to be retained along with the scope of the exception to the rule,
Congress opened the door for abuse through the administrative rule
making process. As a result, the rules promulgated by these
administrative agencies have been significantly weakened in the process
because of extensive lobbying by banks and similarly aligned special
interest groups.38
After receiving public comments, the commissions identified
alterative amounts of credit risk retention to include "[r]equiring sponsors
to retain a fixed amount of more than [five] percent, establishing the risk
retention percentage depending on asset class, and establishing the risk
retention requirement on a sliding scale depending on the risk
characteristics of the underlying loans observable at origination."39 The
commissions dismissed these options because they were "overly
complicated and may create undue compliance and compliance
monitoring burden on market participants and regulators without
providing material benefits over the proposed approaches. 40
There is no evidence, in either the reports issued by federal agencies
34. Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 1.
35. See generally Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract,89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1283 (2014); Wilmarth, supra note 33, at 1390.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-l (2010).
37. Office of the Comptroller of Currency, supra note 30, at 57928.
38. Wilmarth, supra note 33, at 1365.
39. Office of the Comptroller of Currency, supra note 30, at 58016.
40. Id.
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or the various congressional reports, that the five percent requirement is
anything more than unsupported speculation. The commissions' proposal
states that "[b]ecause there is no current risk retention requirement or
voluntary compliance at levels above [five] percent, the Commission
currently lacks sufficient data to quantitatively determine the optimal
amount of risk retention across each asset class." 4 ' A report issued by the
Financial Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC) confirms that "[t]here
is limited literature on the macroeconomic effects of risk retention to
date" but suggests that risk retention, in some form, may align incentives
of parties involved in the securitization process. 42 The report concludes
that partial risk retention "has the potential" to align incentives and "can
help" mitigate risks, but that partial risk retention will not solve all
problems associated with mortgage securitization.43
A partial credit risk retention system of dealing with mortgage
securities has never been attempted in the United States or abroad, which
makes the risk retention provisions highly speculative. Dodd-Frank's
attempt to reform the financial industry by eliminating moral hazard is
not one based on the empirical evidence that one would expect from
major legislation aiming to overhaul the American financial regulatory
scheme. While legislators had a major opportunity to create stability in
financial markets going forward, Dodd-Frank's risk retention rule merely
creates more uncertainty.
B. IncreasedDisclosureRequirements Do Not Eliminate
Information Asymmetry
Another criticism that came out of the financial crisis was that the
information provided to investors in mortgage securities was insufficient
to inform investors of the risk associated with the mortgage securities that
they were purchasing. 44 The bulk of the criticism settled on the major
credit-rating agencies, Moody's Investment Service, Standard & Poor's,
and Fitch Ratings, who evaluate securities based on their relative risk to
investors by "mak[ing] judgments on the future ability and willingness of
an issuer to make timely payments of principal and interest on a security
over the life of an instrument." 45 The result of this evaluation is a rating
or grade that ranges from an extremely low credit risk to a highly
41. Id.
42. FSOC Releases Chairman's Study, Fact Sheet on Risk Retention, Fed. Banking L. Rep.
P 97-470 (C.C.H.), 2011 WL 3773681.

43.

Id.

44. Theresa Nagy, Credit Rating Agencies and the First Amendment: Applying
ConstitutionalJournalisticProtections to Subprime Mortgage Litigation,94 MINN. L. REV. 140,

141 (2009).
45. Id. at 143-44.
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speculative investment, sometimes referred to as junk.
The credit-rating agencies, in large part, assigned the mortgagebacked securities that were subject to intense scrutiny after the financial
crisis an investment-grade rating. 47 In fact, the credit-rating agencies
assigned "AAA" ratings to almost all residential mortgage-backed
securities. 48 In the aftermath, Representative Henry Waxman concluded
that "[t]he story of the credit-rating agencies is the story of a colossal
failure., 49 To date, substantial litigation exists in determining the liability
on the part of the credit-rating agencies and the reasonableness for
investors to rely on their representations. 50 Although Dodd-Frank
addresses this issue by creating an Investor Advisory Committee and
"point-of-sale disclosure" rules, which includes rules that more
accurately disclose cost, risk, and conflicts of interest, information
disclosure does not always help51investors in determining the extent of risk
in complex financial products.
With respect to complex financial products, increased disclosures
does not always produce more educated decisions. 52 For example, the
disclosure made in connection with securities issued in the Enron scandal
generally complied with federal disclosure requirements yet deceived
even the most sophisticated investors. 53 Schwarcz explains that
"[d]isclosure of a complex and convoluted structure to investors of the
originator... may well be either too detailed for many of those investors,
even institutional investors, to understand and assimilate, or too
superficial to allow investors to fully assess the transaction and its
ramifications." 54 It is likely that even if disclosure involving mortgage
securities were more extensive, investors and even the credit agencies
would still be unable to ascertain the risks involved given the complexity
of the mortgage securitization process.
Mortgage securities have special characteristics that increase the
complexity of transactions. Specifically, mortgage securities often
involve SPVs that are created and managed by the originator of the
security, which creates significant conflicts of interest that "undermine

46. Id.at 144.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 146.
49. Id. at 140.
50. See, e.g., Dexia SA/NV v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 231 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); In re Bear Steams Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 746, 750-51
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 624, 634-35
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78pp (2010) (Dodd-Frank's creation of the Investor Advisory

Committee).
52. Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 1.
53. Id.at 2.
54. Id at 4-5.
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the reliability of disclosure."55 In other words, with respect to many
mortgage securities transactions, the interconnectedness of both the
security originator and the SPV manager has the potential
to inhibit
56
disclosure, which in turn furthers information asymmetry.
Lastly, mortgage-backed securities are more complex than traditional
securities because of fluctuations in both value and risk related to real
estate. Mortgage securities derive their value from hundreds of mortgage
57
payments on real estate assets, as opposed to the value of a business.
"Even though real estate's value is always relative to the unchangeable
factor of location, value is also strongly impacted by fluctuating factors,
including the quality and cost of improvements, the availability of capital,
and the legal framework for interests in property." 58 Mortgage securities,
which often include different "tranches" based on the individual
borrower's perceived risk, are difficult, if not impossible, to accurately
assess risk based on the number of factors involved. As a result, DoddFrank's increased disclosure requirements will not, in fact, eliminate
information asymmetry because of the complexity involved in mortgage
securities.
C. Exceptionfor QualifiedResidential MortgagesHas Created
Regulatory Arbitrage
Additionally, Dodd-Frank's skin in the game rule includes an explicit
exception for Qualified Residential Mortgages (QRM) but does not
define the term in the legislation. Instead, Congress delegated defining
the term to federal administrative agencies, which are still in the process
of finalizing their definition. The rulemaking process, including the
public commenting period for all administrative rules, has further
weakened the rule through the creation of a broad definition of the
59
exception.
The statute requires the QRM definition to be based on underwriting
and product features that historical loan performance data indicate result
in a lower risk of default. 60 Congress provides clear guidance on the types
of factors that can be used, including: documentation of income and
assets, debt-to-income ratios and residential income standards, product
features that mitigate payment shock, restrictions or prohibitions on nontraditional features like negative amortization, balloon payments, and
55.

Id.at 1I.

56.

Id.

57. Andrea J. Boyack, Lessons in Price Stability from the US. Real Estate Market
Collapse,2010 MICH. ST.L. REV. 925, 928 (2010).

58.

Id. at 927-28.

59.
60.

Wilmarth, supra note 33, at 1398.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2010).
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prepayment
penalties, and mortgage insurance on low down payment
61
loans.

Initially, federal agencies proposed a narrow interpretation that
included a 20% down payment requirement for borrowers in order for the
mortgage to fit the QRM requirements. 62 Senator Johnny Isakson, a
Republican from Georgia, argued that "[t]he proposed regulation goes
beyond the intent and language of the statute by imposing unnecessarily
tight down payment restrictions. These restrictions unduly narrow the
QRM definition and would necessarily increase consumer costs and
reduce access to affordable credit., 63 Like Isakson, the "overwhelming
majority" of those who submitted comments to the federal administrative
agencies attacked the proposed narrow definition of QRM, arguing that
market and would limit the
it would prevent the recovery of the housing
64
availability of credit to new homebuyers.
As a result of the extensive criticism from industry groups and other
interested parties, the Commissions' final proposed rule widely expanded
the definition of QRM.6 5 The final proposed rule eliminated the down
payment requirement and proposed a QRM definition that mirrored the
Truth in Lending Act's (TILA) definition of qualified mortgages (QM)
as defined in section 129C. 6 6 TILA sets forth the minimum borrower
standards for residential mortgages and requires lenders to make only a
"reasonable and good faith determination" that a borrower can repay the
loan. 6 7 Banks can meet this standard by ensuring that mortgages are not
longer than 30 years in length; that points and fees do not exceed more
than 3% of the total loan; and that the loan does not have risky mortgage
features such as negative amortization, interest-only payments, and
balloon payments. 68 By creating a QRM exception to the credit risk
retention requirements and failing to define the term through legislation,
Congress closed the door on any potential benefit that partial credit risk
retention might have contributed to regulating the financial industry.
D. Higher UnderwritingStandards,Alone, Do Not Fix
Mortgage Securitization
As a result of their broadening of the QRM exception in the skin in
the game rule, regulators have made the credit risk retention requirements
61.

S. REP.NO. 112-157, at81 (2011).

62.

Office of the Comptroller of Currency, supra note 37, at 57932.

63.

Qualified Residential Mortgages, 157 CONG. REc. S3568-01 (2011).

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Office of the Comptroller of Currency, supra note 37, at 57933.
Id. at 57989.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ineffectual because all mortgages that are compliant with the qualified
mortgage definition in TILA, as required by law, will be exempt from
credit risk retention under Dodd-Frank. Failure to abide by TILA
mortgage regulations creates a civil cause of action for consumers, who
are entitled to the sum of (1) actual damages resulting from the TILA
violation, (2) statutory damages, (3) court costs and attorney's fees, and
(4) the sum of any and all fees and finance charges that the consumer paid
to secure the loan. 69 In effect, the broadening of the QRM definition
demonstrates regulatory intent to place the entirety of the blame for the
financial crisis on underwriting standards and the creditworthiness of
borrowers. While underwriting standards indeed did contribute to the
financial crisis, statistical
evidence demonstrates that they were not the
70
sole culprit in the crisis.
The TILA definition of QM and TILA's requirement (that mortgages
must meet QM standards), in itself, has proven to be unsuccessful in
evaluating a borrower's ability to pay. In fact, the agencies final rule
proposal states that of the mortgages that originated during the financial
crisis between 2005-2008 and met TILA's QM criteria, 23% of
mortgages went into default as compared to 44% that did not meet the
QM criteria.71 While the imposition of QM criteria resulted in a reduction
in the risk of default, the 23% default rate of QM compliant mortgages
during the crisis is evidence that the QM criteria would fail to reduce the
risk imposed on investors in mortgage securities to safe investment
levels.
Il1. PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFICATION FOR A FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE TO
MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION

In addition to the weaknesses in Dodd-Frank's credit risk retention
rule and disclosure requirements, there are public policy concerns unique
to mortgages and housing that dictate that mortgage securitization should
be discouraged or prohibited. In many cases, securitized mortgages are
unable to be modified, which can have a devastating impact on distressed
homeowners. 72 Secondly, studies suggest that displacement resulting
from foreclosure can have a multitude of adverse effects on society and
homeowners' ability to accumulate wealth.73 Relatedly, these adverse
15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2010).
70. See generally Office of the Comptroller of Currency, supra note 37.
71. Id. at 57989.

69.

72.

Steven L. Schwarcz, The Conundrum of CoveredBonds, 66 Bus. LAW. 561,579 (2011)

[hereinafter Schwarcz, The Conundrum].
73. Georgette Chapman Phillips, An UrbanSlice ofApple Pie: RethinkingHomeownership
in US. Cities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICs & PUB. POL'Y 187, 208 (2010).
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effects have disproportionately
fallen on historically disadvantaged
74
minorities.
and
groups
Additionally, the banking industry has obligations to the government
under social contract theory and the responsibility to promote the societal
and economic health of the country as a whole in exchange for the
government protection that the banks receive. 75 Moreover, state and
federal government have consistently treated housing differently, as
evidenced by a multitude of legislation and government programs. Lastly,
federal regulators' history of cognitive failure with respect to financial
industry demonstrates the need for structural change. Mortgage
securitization (in any form) runs contrary to all of the foregoing
principles.
A. Securitization Prevents Mortgage Modification
The securitization of mortgages has implications for homeowners,
especially in times of macroeconomic failure. The financial crisis and
subsequent foreclosure boom made clear that securitization had a
negative impact on the ability of distressed homeowners to modify their
mortgages. 76 "Empirical studies reveal that, even in the face of enormous
government pressure to adjust mortgage terms for the benefit of
homeowners, actual mortgage restructuring lags behind expectations,
in
77
part due to the structural complications of securitization."
In an analysis of 3.5 million securitized subprime and alt-A loans for
the month of November 2008, researchers found that of 233,000
mortgages in foreclosure and 69,000 mortgages in bankruptcy, lenders
made only 21,219 modifications that month.7 8 "Of these modifications,
only 10 percent included
some reduction in interest or principal or a
79
forgiveness of fees.",
Some researchers have concluded that securitization and the
restrictions of third-party servicing agreements are contributing factors
that prevent homeowners from modifying their mortgages. 80 One such
analyst concluded that "[t]he complex webs that securitization weaves
can be a trap and leave no one, not even those 81
who own the loans, able to
foreclosure."
from
borrowers
save
effectively
74. Id.
75. Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283,
1286 (2014).
76. Schwarcz, The Conundrum, supra note 72, at 579.
77. Id

78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.

81. Id; Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al. 's "Preventive Servicing Is
Goodfor Business andAffordable HomeownershipPolicy "; What PreventsLoan Modifications?,
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Without the ability to modify their mortgages, homeowners are often
left with little recourse when tragedy such as job loss or illness strikes.
Traditional safety nets such as homeowner savings, governmental
unemployment benefits, state government emergency funds, and nonprofit organization contributions are increasingly insufficient in
adequately protecting homeowners from catastrophic harm.
B. Without the Ability to Modify Securitized Mortgages, Homeowners
Lose Ability to Accumulate Wealth andIncrease
Socioeconomic Mobility
In addition to education, legislators have identified homeownership as
one of the traditional sources of wealth accumulation in American
society. 82 "Home ownership serves as a financial solidifier and a hedge
against economic uncertainty and inflation. There is a direct correlation
between home ownership, greater educational attainment, likelihood of
being married, better family outcomes, higher salaries, greater wealth,
and increased ownership of other assets." 83 Traditionally,
homeownership was seen as a strong mechanism for the working class to
84
save money that could be used for socioeconomic mobility in the future.
The idea was that, over time, all citizens could accumulate enough wealth
from homeownership so that a person's economic success relied
primarily on85 virtue and talents rather than a system of "natural
aristocracy."
Because of the difficulties associated with the loan modification of
securitized mortgages, many families have been unable to accumulate
equity through homeownership. 86 The loss of equity had the largest
impact on minority populations, who lenders often targeted and steered
into subprime loans, despite their qualification for more traditional
loans.87 In one study, researchers estimated that minority borrowers lost
nearly a quarter of a trillion dollars in equity as a result of the foreclosure
of their homes in the financial crisis.8 8 Similarly, a New York Times
study found that "black households making more than $68,000 a year are
almost five times as likely to hold high-interest subprime mortgages as
18 HoUSING POL'Y DEBATE 279, 292 (2007) (internal citation omitted).
82. Richard Q. Lewis Ill, Are Tax Expenditures Reaching Their Goals? A View from the
Fiscal Cliff, 87 FLA. BARJ. 28, 29 (2013).

83. Id.
84. Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN ST. L. REV.
417, 428 (2008).
85. Id. at 424.
86. Schwarcz, The Conundrum, supra note 72, at 579.
87. Raymond H. Brescia, The Cost ofInequality: Social Distance,PredatoryConduct,and
the FinancialCrisis, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 641, 645 (2011).
88. Phillips, supra note 73, at 207-08.
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89
are white of similar- or even lower- incomes."
Protecting homeowner equity, especially for disadvantaged
populations, is a necessary goal of any legal or regulatory framework for
residential mortgages. If homeowner equity cannot be protected through
financial downturns, an essential purpose of homeownership no longer
exists and the working class has lost one of its primary tools in
accumulating wealth.

C. Mortgage SecuritizationRuns Contrary to Social ContractPrinciples
Social contract theory dates back to the debates between the Founders
on the necessity of a national bank and identifies a special implicit
relationship between the nation's banks and the government. 90 "Even
early on, the proponents of banks had at least some sense that banks must
be saved from themselves in some matters." 91 As part of traditional bank
functions, banks invest
in long-term loans and pay for these loans through
92
deposits.
consumer
This operational structure exposes banks to the risk of mass
withdrawals of deposits (i.e., runs on the banks).9 3 The government
provides protection to banks for this risk that it does not provide to other
for-profit corporations through the provision of deposit insurance,
Federal Reserve liquidity support, and bailouts. 94 Likewise, the
government needs banks to contribute to a healthy economy. "Banks
facilitate efficient trade and transaction-making and enable the flow of
resources across the economy. Banking is also the medium through which
the government, through
the Federal Reserve, can implement fiscal and
95
monetary policy."
Social contract theory posits that banks must provide adequate
consideration for the government protections that it receives. 96 "If the
banks are to remain large and powerful and capable of causing systemic
panic and collapse with only the government standing between them and
failure, the government must demand more from these banks than they
currently do." 97 In accord with social contract theory: "[T]he government
needs to be clear that of paramount importance in banking are safety and
soundness, consumer protection, and access to credit." 98 Using social
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Brescia, supranote 87, at 645 (internal citations omitted).
Baradaran, supra note 75, at 1292.
Id.
Id. at 1314.
Id.
Id.

95.

Id. at 1313.

96.
97.

Id. at 1330.
Id.

98.

Id.
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contract principles, it is clear that the federal government must utilize a
system that requires banks to provide more consideration in the form of
complete credit risk retention.
D. Prioritieson Housing Stability Dictates Special Treatment of
Mortgages as FinancialInstruments
Both federal and state statutes provide abundant examples of housing
being treated differently from other property. The famous philosopher
Aristotle once stated that "[a] house was not a solitary, autonomous, selfsubsisting unit, even when occupied by a household, but rather a locus in
many partially overlapping environments or complexes... ."99 Aristotle's
recognition of the importance and interconnectedness of housing with
other spheres of life carried through to modern times, where Americans
began to benefit from federal public and subsidized housing programs
beginning with the Housing Act of 1937 shortly after the Great
Depression. 100 This theory of housing as an integral part of a healthy
society has evolved to the proposition 0that
housing deserves
1
constitutional protection, at least in some form.'
While no state has gone as far as to declare a state constitutional right
to housing, both state courts and legislatures have made clear the
necessity of protecting housing in various forms. Both public housing and
publicly subsidized housing programs have continued past the Great
Depression and provide further examples of housing being given special
importance, even in the absence of ownership. These programs have
traditionally sought to address the lack of availability of affordable
housing and prevent citizens from becoming "ill-housed," as President
Roosevelt said with respect to an affordable housing shortage after the
Great Depression. 10 2 Through these programs and many others, the
federal government recognizes an important goal in attempting
to provide
03
decent, sanitary housing for every American family. 1
Another common manner of government housing protection comes in
bankruptcy, where homestead exemptions provide a safeguard to a
family's home from creditors. Homestead exceptions first became
available through the federal government in 1791, through the Homestead
Act, which sought to provide "a home, a place of residence, which he
may improve and make comfortable, and where the family may be
99.

Shelby D. Green, ImaginingA Right to Housing, Lying in the Interstices, 19 GEO. J. ON

POVERTY L. & POL'Y 393, 417 (2012).

100. Id. at418.
101. Id. at 442.
102. Id. at 418-19 (internal citations omitted).
103. Kellis E. Parker, The Administration of Publicly-Aided Housing, 74 COLUM. L.
139, 141-42 (1974).

REV.
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sheltered and live beyond the reach of those financial misfortunes
which
l0 4
even the most prudent and sagacious cannot always avoid."'
In Florida, "the purpose of the homestead exemption [in bankruptcy]
is to promote the stability and welfare of the state by securing to the
householder a home, so that the homeowner and his or her heirs may live
beyond the reach of financial misfortune and the demands of creditors
who have given credit under such law."' ' The federal tax code similarly
encourages home ownership by providing tax benefits for
homeowners.' 06 These deductions often include home mortgage interest
deductions, real property tax deductions, and capital gains tax exclusions
07
for homeowners who profit from the sale of their principal residence.'
"With the positive consequences of home ownership, it is clear why the
federal government provides0 8these incentives through tax expenditures to
create more homeowners."'
State governments likewise provide economic incentives to encourage
homeownership. In addition to various state bankruptcy homestead
exceptions, states are able to create tax deductions and other programs to
both encourage and protect homeownership. In Florida, the legislature
created the Florida Homeownership Assistance Program "for the purpose
of assisting low-income and moderate-income persons in purchasing a
home as their primary residence ...."109 Other states acted to protect
homeownership during the foreclosure crisis, which had a tremendous
impact on many state governments. For example, North Carolina passed
the Reduce Home Foreclosure Act, which created the State Home
Foreclosure Prevention Project for the purpose of providing funds so that
distressed homeowners could avoid foreclosure of their primary
residence." 10 Both of these state programs are typical examples of state
governments creating incentives and protection for homeownership.
E. Regulators'Historyof Cognitive FailureDemonstratesNeedfor
Structural Change
Lastly, the financial industry's long history of regulation has brought

104.

Ryan P. Rivera, State HomesteadExemptions and Their Effect on FederalBankruptcy

Laws, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 71, 92 (2004).

105. Callava v. Feinberg, 864 So. 2d 429, 432 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (quoting Pub. Health
Trust of Dade Cty. v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 948 (Fla. 1988)).
106. Lewis, supra note 82, at 29.
107. Kenya Covington & Rodney Harrell, From Renting to Homeownership: Using Tax
Incentives to Encourage HomeownershipAmong Renters, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 103 (2007).

108.

Lewis, supra note, at 29.

109.

FLA. STAT. § 420.5088 (2014).

110.

Carolyn E. Waldrep, North Carolina's Emergency Measures to Reduce Home

Foreclosures, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 453, 462 (2009).
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to light financial regulators' susceptibility to cognitive failure." I'
Cognitive failure reflects the good intentions of regulators but their
traditionally poor execution due to the intricate relationship financial
regulators share with executives of major stakeholders in the financial
industry.""2 Kling explains that "[r]egulators, sharing the same cognitive
environment as financial industry executives, are unlikely to be able to
distinguish evolutionary changes that are dangerous from those that are
benign.",113 Kling concludes that under a cognitive failure approach, "[i]t
may not be possible to design a foolproof regulatory system.""' 4 Many
regulators are former financial industry executives, calling into question
whether regulators can exercise independent judgment based on their
previous positions.
Congress's financial market regulation under Dodd-Frank is
susceptible to criticism based on cognitive failure theory primarily due to
its expansion and heavy reliance on the very administrative agencies that
failed to stop the financial crisis even after it became apparent that there
was something wrong. Freddie Mac, a government sponsored entity and
quasi-administrative agency, is illustrative of this point." 5
In early 2004, the New York Times reported that Freddie Mac's CEO,
Richard Syron, received a memorandum from his chief risk officer
arguing against the purchase of mortgages that were obtained without the
required documentation. 1 6 Shortly after receiving the memoranda,
Syron expanded Freddie Mac's acquisition of the high-risk mortgages
that the memoranda argued against. 1 7 Syon, a former CEO of the
American Stock Exchange (now the National Association of Securities
Dealers), was unable to recognize the risk associated with lower lending
standards and instead "thought Freddie Mac had been too conservative in
the past and needed to demonstrate a greater commitment to the mission
of making home ownership more affordable." ' "18 Other financial
regulatory failures include the approval of questionable accounting
standards in the Enron scandal" 9 and the missed opportunity to regulate
the credit default swaps that caused the bankruptcy of many financial
111. Arnold Kling, The FinancialCrisis: Moral Failureor Cognitive Failure?, 33 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 507, 508 (2010).

112.
113.

Id.at509.
Id.

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 510.
119. See Miriam Miquelon Weismann,CorporateTransparencyor CongressionalWindowDressing? The Case Against Sarbanes-Oxleyas a Means to Avoid Another CorporateDebacle:
The Failed Attempt to Revive Meaningful Regulatory Oversight, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 98,
100 (2004).

GRABBING THE BULL BY THE HORNS. THE FUTURE OF MORTGAGE LENDING

institutions. 120
As the administrative agencies implemented regulations, regulatory
arbitrage became an accepted part of the process through the creation of
shadow banking institutions and other complex financial products that
were not subject to regulatory oversight. 12 1 "At the time, however,
lending regulatory authorities acknowledged and even applauded the use
of these techniques. In fact, regulators were proud
of the role they played
1' 22
in stimulating and spreading these innovations.'
Because of the obligation that banks have to provide consideration for
the government protections they receive, banks must consider the social
and economic implications of their actions. Mortgage securitization,
while providing banks with access to capital, inhibits mortgage
modifications, has the potential to limit socioeconomic mobility, and
presents substantial risk exposure to investors in mortgage backed
securities because of misaligned incentives and information asymmetry.
The fact that housing stability and homeownership are traditionally
treated differently and financial regulatory agencies have failed to
appropriately regulate in the past provides further justification that
securitization is not proper for mortgages.
IV.

COVERED BONDS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO MORTGAGE
SECURITIZATION

Federal legislators have the opportunity to create a stronger, safer, and
more stable financial market in the United States. While mortgage
securitization provides banks with access to capital, which benefits both
the banks and consumers seeking to purchase homes, it has serious
detrimental consequences. The introduction, encouragement, and
facilitation of covered bonds through federal legislation are solutions that
address all of the underlying problems with securitization while
continuing to provide financial institutions with access to capital. More
importantly, a covered bond system has been in existence in Europe for
more than a century, which provides legislators with the benefit of
evidence to evaluate the propensity for success of a new covered bond
system in the United States.
Although a system of covered bonds may be the strongest solution to
the financial crisis, the implementation of a covered bond system is not
without obstacles. The lack of a legal framework and resistance on the
part of the FDIC may make a covered bond system difficult to pass
120. See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap
Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 221-23 (2011).
121. SeeKling,supranote 111,at514.
122. Id.
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through Congress, but these obstacles can be overcome.
A. History and Characteristicsof a Covered Bond System
While it may be in the public's economic and social interest to prohibit
mortgage securitization, this must be balanced by the financial industry's
need for access to capital. Without the ability to transfer their interest in
a mortgage, the amount of funds available for future loans has the
potential to be diminished by mortgage obligations. Homeowners need
access to credit in the form of mortgages; such lending arrangements
enable borrowers to build equity in a home. As explained above, banking
capital requirements promote the distribution of mortgages. All of these
needs can be met through the incorporation and use of covered bonds in
American financial markets.
The U.S. Treasury has defined covered bonds as "a debt instrument
secured by a perfected security interest in a specific pool of collateral. 123
Covered bonds date back to eighteenth century Prussia and became a
formal part of the German financial structure in 1900.124 Despite its
proliferation to other parts of Europe, the demand for covered bonds
shrunk until the late 20th century. 125 "Then, in the 1990s, the market for
covered bonds was revitalized by introduction of the German benchmark
Pfandbrief in 1995 and also by investor demand for securities
diversification in response to the introduction of the Euro, which
1 26
hampered the ability to use currencies to diversify investments."
Financial institutions in the United States took notice of their European
counterparts when Washington Mutual entered the covered bond market
in 2006 and Bank of America quickly followed in 2007.127 Regulators
followed the private sector's lead and the FDIC issued a policy statement
in 2008 followed by the U.S. Treasury's issuance of28a best practices guide
for the covered bond market in the United States.
While financial markets in the United States continue to rely on
securitization, support for the covered bond market is growing. 129 One of
the most recognizable advocates has been former United States Treasury
123. Carol J. Perry, Rethinking Fannieand Freddie'sNew Insolvency Regime, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 1752, 1779 (2009) (quoting DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BEST PRACTICES FOR RESIDENTIAL
COVERED BONDS 7 (2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/US
CoveredBondBestPractices.pdf).
124. Schwarcz, The Conundrum, supra note 72, at 564.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Miller Jefferson, The Emerging US. Market for Covered Bonds, 13 N.C. BANKING
INST. 263, 266-67 (2009).

129. Id. at 263 (citing statements made by former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson
and former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke).
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Secretary Henry Paulson, who stated that covered bonds could "increase
mortgage financing, improve underwriting standards, and strengthen U.S.
Financial institutions by providing new funding sources that will
diversify their overall portfolio."' 30 Experts estimate that covered bonds
now comprise a 3.3 trillion dollar business in Europe but they are
virtually unregulated and unsupported in the United States.' 31
Covered bonds have two characteristics that are critical: they are
secured by high-quality collateral and they have unsecured recourse
against the issuer in the event of a collateral deficiency.' 32 In a covered
bond system, cover-pool assets typically remain on the issuer's balance
sheet for accounting purposes.1 33 These assets are usually "ring-fenced,"
or isolated, to protect covered bond investors in the event of the issuer's
bankruptcy. 134 A final defining characteristic of covered bonds is that
weak cover-pool assets are typically replaced by good-quality assets
throughout the life of the bonds, thereby maintaining the requisite
overcollateralization.' 35 The key differences between covered bonds and
mortgage securities are the allocation of risk and the "off-balance sheet"
36
accounting, although the latter is a somewhat artificial distinction.1
Covered bonds offer solutions to some of the weaknesses of
securitization while not serving as an insurmountable impediment to
mortgage lending. Schwarcz notes that "[c]overed bonds, by contrast, are
considered by some in the financial industry as avoiding moral hazard
because issuers of covered bonds often retain ownership of the coverpool assets, maintaining these assets for accounting purposes on their
balance sheet."' 137 Some proponents also believe that covered bonds allow
for more flexibility to accommodate loan modifications because the loans
in the cover pool remain with the originator/issuer. 38 The information
asymmetry issues that plagued securitized mortgage investors would
likewise be neutralized because the necessity of information concerning
the quality of assets in the pool is diminished when the investor bears no
risk of loss. Lastly, a covered bond system is theoretically less dependent
on regulatory actors and cognitive failure because the changes are
130. Id. (quoting Nightly Business Report: Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's Bond
Bailout Plan (PBS television broadcast July 28, 2008) (transcript online at
http://www.pbs.org/nbr/site/onair/transcripts/O80728a/)).
131.

Id. (quoting David Cho, Treasury,Banks Promote 'CoveredBonds,' WASH. POST, July

29, 2008, at DOI, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/
28/AR2008072801512.html.).
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structural and would not require extensive regulatory involvement in
either rulemaking or enforcement.
B. Obstaclesfor the Implementation of a Covered Bond
System in the United States
While a covered bond system is a strong solution to the problems
associated with mortgage securitization, there may be certain obstacles in
the event that the United States switched to a covered bond system.
Although a covered bond system would be safe for investors, there would
be some risk for U.S. taxpayers, who provide deposit insurance through
the FDIC for banks in the event of issuer default. 139 In an attempt to
combat the risk shift, the FDIC has created policies that require covered
bond issues to comprise only a small percentage of the issuer's total
liabilities. 140 These policies have contributed, in part, to preventing
covered bonds from becoming a securitization alternative in the United
States.14 1 Note, however, that U.S. taxpayers were the source of the
bailout money paid out after the crisis causes, in part, by mortgage
securitization.
At least one scholar suggests that legislators can overcome issues
pertaining to insolvency protection for a covered bond system through
the creation of a compliment to the FDIC, the Covered Bond Insurance
Corporation (CBIC).142 According to Perry, the CBIC would combat the
moral hazard of providing insolvency protection and risk incentive
through a parallel program to federal deposit insurance. 143 "First, [the
CBIC] would narrowly tailor the insurance to the problem of providing a
liquid secondary mortgage market. Second, it would limit risky behavior
by only insuring covered bonds and not the more risky MBS that Fannie
and Freddie currently issue." 144 The CBIC could be an attractive solution
in the event that insolvency coverage for covered bonds through the FDIC
is not politically feasible.
A second challenge would be the lack of a regulatory framework from
which covered bonds could be legitimized. Representative Scott Garrett
made an attempt to establish such a framework in 2008 through the
introduction of the Equal Treatment of Covered Bonds Act of 2008 but
that legislation never made it out of the House Committee on Financial
Services.1 4 5 Absent a legal framework for covered bonds, the United
139.
140.

Jefferson, supra note 128, at 277-78.
Id.at 278.

141.

Id.

142.

Perry, supra note 123, at 1777.

143.
144.
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Idat 1780.
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States system relies solely on contract law and the Uniform Commercial
Code. 146 While such reliance does not necessarily prevent the
enforcement or legal validity of a covered bond, it does little to encourage
or legitimize the use of covered bonds that might make both lenders and
investors hesitate to utilize them. In a public statement, the American
Securitization Forum echoed the need for a "more holistic legal
framework" that "plainly recognizes
covered bonds as a distinct asset
147
class and a true rate product."'
To overcome these obstacles, Congress must pass legislation that
provides a legitimate legal framework for covered bonds in the United
States. This framework includes legislation that will create incentives for
lenders to switch to covered bonds and also legislation that clarifies
covered bond insolvency procedures. Legislative incentives may include
a prohibition of mortgage securitization or a combination of less drastic
economic, tax, or legal incentives. In the event that Congress tasks the
FDIC to insure covered bonds, regulators must strenuously enforce
higher lending standards so as not to present a significant risk to Federal
Reserve funds.
V. STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS

In addition to federal reform efforts aimed at correcting the regulation
of financial institutions involved in the mortgage lending process, state
governments have focused their reform efforts on consumers and the
court system. Current systems involving the creation of state government
oversight, temporary assistance or safety nets, and credit services have
been popular state solutions but are not sustainable and thus are
inadequate in preventing future crisis. Therefore, a system of alternative
dispute resolution incorporating mandatory mediation is the best weapon
that state legislatures may use to accomplish its goals of protecting
consumers and the accumulation of homeowner equity.
A. ForeclosuresSwamp State Judiciaries
State government first experienced the bulk of the adverse residual
effects of the financial crisis through the court system and quickly
realized that this problem was not one that would easily go away. One
scholar described the impact of the foreclosure crisis on state and local
government as "surreal" or "Dickensian."' 148 For example, the Lee
146. Id at 280.
147. Id. at 282-83.
148. Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brieffor the Federalization
of State Mortgage ForeclosureLaw, 37 PEPP. L. REv. 583, 586 (2010).
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County, Florida court docket skyrocketed from a normal case level of
1,900 cases to 24,000 cases in February 2009.149 One journalist described
the scene in Lee County, stating:
During a break in the [judicial] hearing, lawyers used dollies to
wheel in boxes containing hundreds of case files, which they piled
onto tables and on the floor. One lawyer

. . .

ran between the

judge's bench and the dozens of open boxes on the floor. His
colleagues
sat cross-legged on the courtroom floor, sorting through
150
the files.

The scene in Lee County was not atypical to what was witnessed by
courts across the country where judges were forced to come out of
retirement in order to attempt to accommodate the volume of foreclosure
cases.15 1 Judicial evaluations of foreclosure cases were often limited to
two questions.' 52 If the homeowners were in fact behind on their
mortgage and continued to live at the property, a judge would typically
order the homeowners to move within sixty days. 53 "Little to no time
was spent by the judge assessing the merits of the foreclosure petition,
such as whether the entity seeking foreclosure154had the legal right to do so
and whether it had complied with state law."'
B. Temporary Solutions to PermanentProblems Through
Reliance on the HardestHit Fund
States have addressed mortgage lending and foreclosure issues in a
few ways, generally leaving the bulk of mortgage lending reform to the
federal government while focusing instead on "a variety of public policy
interventions designed to slow foreclosure rates, stop unnecessary
foreclosures, and help homeowners remain in their homes."' 5 5 These
solutions have focused primarily on temporary and unsustainable aid
through the creation of government agencies, programs, and emergency
funds.' 5 6 States, unlike the federal counterparts, often must balance their
budget every year due to financial concerns in creating policy that calls
for the creation of government programs or agencies through the use of
149.

Id.

150. Id. at 587 (quoting M ichael Corkery, A FloridaCourt's 'Rocket Docket'BlastsThrough
ForeclosureCases, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, at A1).
151. Lydia Nussbaum, ADR's Placein Foreclosure:Remedying the Flaws of a Securitized
Housing Market, 34 CARDOzo L. REV. 1889, 1907 (2013).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1891.
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nonrenewable funds.
One such example is the State Home Foreclosure Prevention Project
(SHFPP), a state government program created by the Emergency
Program to Reduce Home Foreclosure Act (Act) in North Carolina that
is administered by the North Carolina Housing Finance Agency and
funded primarily through federal funds delivered through the U.S.
Treasury Department's Hardest Hit Fund. 157 The Department requires
state housing finance agencies to create and administer foreclosure
assistance programs that consist of unemployment assistance, mortgage
modifications, mortgage modifications with principal forbearance, short
sales, deeds in lieu of 58
foreclosure, principal reduction programs, and
second lien reductions.'
The purpose of the North Carolina program "is to seek solutions to
avoid foreclosures for certain subprime loans."' 59 The centerpiece of the
program is the legal review of subprime loans by a team of paralegals,
legal volunteers, and law students who determine whether the terms of a
given loan exhibit "red flags" for possible violations of federal and state
lending laws.1 60 Red flagged loans are then reviewed by attorneys, who
determine the validity of lending violations. 161 If violations are verified,
licensed attorneys then engage in discussions with banks and servicers on
possible remedies ranging from settlement to suit.1 62 In addition to the
provision of legal services under the program, the program includes
63
consumer education services in order to increase financial literacy.
States relying on the Hardest Hit Fund resources as their sole response
to the mortgage crisis are not doing enough to protect consumers in the
future. Because the Hardest Hit Fund and the programs and
administrative agencies that are funded by it are finite, nonrenewable
funds, the benefits that the programs bring will stop as soon as the money
does. One such permanent solution that has been adopted by some states
164
that can be effective is mandatory mediation in all foreclosure cases.
While mediation is still gaining momentum in foreclosure cases, it has
proven to work successfully
in other areas of law such as divorce and
1 65
compensation.
workers'
157. Waldrep, supra note 110, at 462.
158. Second Round of Assistance for Hardest-Hit Housing Markets Announced to Help
Address Urgent Problems Facing Families With Concentrated Areas of Economic Distress, 2010
WL 7364352 (Mar. 29, 2010).
159. Waldrep, supra note 110, at 463.
160. Id. at 463-64.
161. Id.at464.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Nussbaum, supra note 151, at 1908.
165. Holly A. Streeter-Schaefer, A Look at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49 DRAKE L.
REv. 367, 378 (2001).
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C. MandatoryMediation as a State Solution to Mortgage Securitization
Mandatory alternative dispute resolutions such as mediation,
conciliation, or a facilitated settlement negotiation meeting have "the
potential to address the problems of securitization by establishing direct
communication between a homeowner and a decision-maker with the
authority to undertake an alternative to foreclosure."' 166 A mandatory
mediation program could achieve success to all involved parties by
eliminating communication barriers between homeowners and lenders,
providing oversight on the legal process, educating homeowners about
their legal rights, alleviating the judiciary's overwhelming
caseload, and
67
mitigating the impact on distressed communities.'
Mediation most importantly corrects the misaligned incentives of loan
servicers. 168 Loan servicers inherently prefer foreclosure over loan
modifications for two principal reasons: the servicers' reliance on an
automated and efficient manner of servicing mortgages
and the servicer's
169
incentives to generate fees and minimize cost.
Because of how the loan servicing industry is structured, loan
servicers are incentivized to foreclose rather than engage in a costbenefit analysis to determine the option that would most benefit
investors' financial interests. As a consequence, little
communication occurs between loan servicers and borrowers. This
is especially problematic when a loan is delinquent and
communication
is critical to determine whether foreclosure is the
0
best option.'

7

Foreclosure mediation programs vary greatly by jurisdiction. Some
use judicial resources to pay staff to conduct mediations while others rely
17
on volunteers or require the parties to make their own arrangements.
Despite the variations, "[a]n increasing number of foreclosure mediation
programs are self-supporting. In these programs, either the lender or the
borrower, or sometimes both, bears the cost of the mediation through
filing surcharges, mediation participation fees, and penalties for failure to
comply with program requirements. The collected fees and penalties go
into a separate operating fund to pay for mediators, administrative costs,
and operating expenses. Surplus in the operating fund can be distributed
to housing counselors and non-profit agencies that assist with the
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1908.
168.

Id.at 1898.

169. Id. at 1899.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1922.
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program."1
There are additional budgetary reasons to implement a mandatory
mediation program for foreclosure cases. 173 Certain states, such as
Nevada and Washington, have mandatory mediation programs for
foreclosures that require the users of the services to bear the costs of
mediation.' 74 These fees, in addition to fees that are generated by filing
of court documents, represent significant income for states. 7 5 For
example, Nevada charges the lender in a foreclosure action $200 to file a
notice of default and directs $45 of that amount toward the state's
foreclosure mediation program.' 76 The remaining funds are distributed
between funds for legal aid attorneys and the State's general fund.177 The
178
fees appear to have had a positive impact on the state's budget.
According to published reports, Nevada's fee structure has generated
between $6-8 million in the span of only one year, which has reduced
Nevada's deficit. 79 "Generating revenue from lenders and diverting that
revenue into state coffers is a' creative
way to fund consumer protection
80
and legal services programs."'
Lastly, any state that implements a mandatory mediation foreclosure
program should create such a program through legislation and notjudicial
order because the legislature has more resources than the judiciary and is
better equipped to conduct program evaluation through statistical
analysis and research. 18' "State legislatures or city councils have a
lengthy political process but, because legislatures control the purse
strings and have the power to deploy more state resources than the
judiciary, programs created by the legislature have the potential 1to
be
82
much more expansive and perhaps more effectively administered."'
VI. CONCLUSION

Both federal and state government must seize the opportunity to grab
the bull by the horns. The Dodd-Frank Act, while still in various stages
of implementation, is unlikely to be successful addressing the problems
that caused the crisis because partial credit risk retention has not proven
172.
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175.
176.
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179.
180.
181.
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Id.
Id.
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to be successful in eliminating moral hazard and the qualified residential
mortgage exception is so broad as to make the rule ineffectual. Because
of the unique social contract between banks and the government, along
with the impact that the mortgage crisis has had on American society,
mortgage securitization is not the proper solution for the mortgage
lending industry. Instead, the focus should shift to creating the legal
framework necessary for covered bonds to flourish as an effective, and
safer, alternative to mortgage securitization while providing financial
institutions the access to capital needed for economic growth and
stability.
State reforms are likewise inadequate in that they are not sustainable
and the benefits derived from the programs will dissipate as soon as the
funds do. In order to address the inherent issues of mortgage
securitization and more importantly to protect consumers' ability to
create equity through homeownership, states should create legislation to
require mandatory mediation. A mediation program has the potential of
generating revenue for tight state budgets, saving homeownership for
citizens through increased communication between parties, and
increasing awareness of legal rights and resources.

